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Class Arbitration: Is it for the Court or an Arbitrator to Decide? 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The number of companies that use arbitration clauses has increased. 1  For example, 
common news outlets such as CNN have incorporated arbitration clauses into their terms of 
service.2 The increase in popularity of arbitration clauses has caused questions regarding the 
interpretation of arbitration agreements when an arbitration clause is not specific and is ambiguous 
as to class arbitration. This occurs when an arbitration clause contains direct language that certain 
matters will be arbitrated but the clause is ambiguous on class arbitration.3 The ambiguity creates 
a problem determining whether the consumer or employee can join with other class members when 
the arbitration clause does not explicitly waive it.  
Currently, the United States has a strong policy in favor of arbitration evidenced by the 
Federal Arbitration Act.4 In light of this policy, courts will uphold arbitration clauses unless there 
are “grounds in law or equity” to revoke the clause.5 Who makes the decision whether class 
arbitration is permissible under an arbitration agreement has become an increasingly important 
issue. The issue of who decides whether class arbitration is permissible arises when an arbitration 
clause does not have a class action waiver and does not specifically state that arbitrators are decide 
whether or not class arbitration is permissible.6  
                                                 
1 Kathleen Pender, Wells Fargo Tightens Tough Arbitration Agreement, SF TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2012) 
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Wells-Fargo-tightens-tough-arbitration-agreement-2575609.php (“more 
companies have added clauses to forced arbitration agreements prohibiting consumers from initiating or 
participating in class-action suits.”); David S. Clancy & Matthew M.K. Stein, “An Uninvited Guest: Class 
Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act's Legislative History,” 63 BUS. LAW. 55, 56 (2007); Theodore Eisenberg 
et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer 
Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871, 880, 882-84 (2008) 
2 See Terms of Service (January 18, 2015) http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/06/world/terms-service/ 
3 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1764, 1772 (2010); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 
761 F.3d 326, 332-334 (3d Cir. 2014) 
4 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858 (1984); Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 
476, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1254 (1989); 9 U.S.C.S § 2 
5 9 U.S.C.S § 2 
6 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1764, 1772 (2010) 
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The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether courts or arbitrators decide if an arbitration 
clause permits class-wide arbitration. Currently, there is a split in the circuit courts on the issue. 
Two circuit courts have ruled that a court rather than an arbitrator should decide whether an 
arbitration clause allows class arbitration.7 Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit, prior to the most recent 
Supreme Court decisions on class arbitration, held that arbitrators should decide whether or not an 
arbitration clause permits class arbitration.8 
It is important to classify the question of class arbitrability as a “gateway” matter or a 
“subsidiary” matter in order to address whether the question of class arbitrability is for an arbitrator 
or a court to decide. Gateway matters address whether the parties’ action is governed by the 
arbitration agreement.9 In other words, they relate to whether or not the parties are bound by the 
arbitration agreement or whether a binding arbitration clause applies to the particular issue.10 For 
example, jurisdictional or threshold issues are gateway matters. 11  Conversely, subsidiary 
questions are questions that “grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition.”12 Normally, 
gateway matters are for the court to decide and subsidiary matters are for the arbitrators to decide.13 
Unless the parties explicitly allocate gateway issues to an arbitrator, the gateway matters are for a 
court to address.14  
Because class arbitration is inherently different than bilateral arbitration, this note focuses 
                                                 
7 Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2014); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th 
Cir. 2013) 
8 Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2003) 
9 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 (2002) 
10 Id. 
11 Paul Bennett IV, Waiving" Goodbye to Arbitration: A Contractual Approach, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1628 
(2012) 
12 Id. (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S.Ct. 909, 918 (1964)) 
13 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 (2002) 
14 Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielson, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion And The Future 
Of American Arbitraiton, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 323, 347-349 (2011); See e.g. AT&T Techs. v. Communs. 
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 106 S.Ct. 1415 (1986);  
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on why a court should decide whether or not the arbitration agreement permits class-wide 
arbitration. This note does not address non-class joinder issues or other multiparty arbitration 
issues. Class arbitration is different from non-class joinder because of the class size15 and the type 
of relief requested and therefore this analysis focuses solely on class arbitration.16  
Part II provides a brief background on the Federal Arbitration Act, Supreme Court 
decisions discussing class arbitrability, and the circuit split addressing who decides the question 
of class arbitration. Part III will explain why the Third and Sixth Circuit analyses are correct in 
determining that a court should decide whether or not an agreement permits class arbitration. The 
analysis will focus on why that the question of class arbitrability is a gateway matter and why the 
courts are better equipped to deal with the issue of class arbitrability. Further, it will discuss the 
repercussions of having a court decide whether an arbitration clause permits class-wide arbitration. 
Part IV will summarize the analysis. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE FEEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
The United States has a strong policy in favor of arbitration.17 In 1925, the United States 
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in order to ensure that parties’ agreements 
were enforced.18 The Savings Clause of the FAA states,  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, 
                                                 
15 AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, Rule 4(a)(1) available at 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrstg_004
129.pdf; See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); JAMS Class Action Procedures, Rule 3(a) available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-class-action-procedures/ 
16 S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration Change the Nature of Arbitration? Stolt- Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First 
Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 218-19 (2012) (“Class arbitrations involve representative, rather than 
individual, claims”); Maureen Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class 
Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711 (discussing due process concerns with class arbitration) 
17 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858 (1984) 
18 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1242 (1985) 
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or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy 
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
 
9 U.S.C.S § 2. This portion of the FAA is important because it makes arbitration agreements 
enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”19 Therefore, arbitration agreements will control how parties proceed in their dispute 
despite whether or not a party prefers to resolve the matter in court.  The FAA also states that the 
court can make an “order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement.”20  This means that arbitration agreements are contracts and will be 
interpreted by the court through the lens of contract law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has 
maintained that parties have leeway to limit their own arbitration agreement.21 Thus, parties may 
incorporate terms into their arbitration agreement if they so choose. The strong policy favoring 
arbitration and a policy adherencing to the terms agreed upon by the parties creates the backdrop 
for the class arbitrability issue at hand. 
B. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
Currently, there is no majority Supreme Court decision that addresses who decides whether 
an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration when the arbitration agreement does not specify 
who decides the issue.22 Bazzle was the first Supreme Court decision to directly discuss the issue 
of who decides if an arbitration agreement permits class arbitrability.23 Following Bazzle, the court 
has addressed the issue of class arbitration in several Supreme Court decisions, but has not decided 
                                                 
19 9 U.S.C.S § 2 
20 9 U.S.C.S § 4 
21 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“[The arbitration agreement] can be specified, 
for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings be kept confidential to 
protect trade secrets.” 
22 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013) 
23 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003) 
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whether class arbitration is a gateway issue or subsidiary issue when an arbitration agreement is 
silent on whether it permits class arbitration.24 
1. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle 
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle was the first Supreme Court case to address the issue 
squarely, but the Supreme Court failed to obtain a majority of the justices in its decision.25  
Respondents Lynn and Burt Bazzle received a home improvement loan with an arbitration clause 
from Green Tree.26 The arbitration clause read:  
“ARBITRATION--All disputes, claims, or controversies arising 
from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result 
from this contract . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration by 
one arbitrator selected by us with consent of you. This arbitration 
contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, 
and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. 
section 1 [9 U.S.C.S. § 1] . . . . THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY 
AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A 
JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION 
UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO COURT ACTION 
BY US (AS PROVIDED HEREIN). . . . The parties agree and 
understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the 
law and the contract. These powers shall include all legal and 
equitable remedies, including, but not limited to, money damages, 
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief."27  
 
Both sets of customers claimed that Green Tree failed to provide a form that explained that they 
had a right to name their own lawyers and insurance agents.28  
The Bazzles wished to certify a class in their action, and Green Tree “sought a stay of the 
court proceeding.” 29  The South Carolina state trial court certified the class and compelled 
                                                 
24 See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 
U.S. 662 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) 
25 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003) 
26 Id. at 447 (“Daniel Lackey and George and Florine Buggs [also] entered into loan contracts and security 
agreements for the purchase of mobile homes with Green Tree.”) 
27 Id. at 448 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 449 
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arbitration and the arbitrator awarded “the class $10,935,000 in statutory damages, along with 
attorney's fees.30” Lackey and the Buggses also sought class certification in court.31 The trial court 
denied Green Tree’s motion to compel arbitration and the state court of appeals reversed. 32 The 
parties proceeded to pick an arbitrator and the arbitrator certified class arbitration.33 The arbitrator 
“awarded the class $9,200,000 in statutory damages in addition to attorney's fees.”34 Green Tree 
appealed both cases, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina consolidated the cases. 35 The court 
held that the contracts “were silent in respect to class arbitration, that they consequently authorized 
class arbitration, and that arbitration had properly taken that form.”36 The Supreme Court of the 
United States granted certiorari.37 
The Supreme Court examined whether the arbitration clause at issue permitted class-wide 
arbitration.38 Green Tree argued that class arbitration was impermissible under the arbitration 
agreement.39 The plurality held that the arbitrator should decide whether the arbitration agreement 
permitted class arbitration.40 The plurality stated that the question of whether class arbitration is 
permitted in the arbitration agreement is not a gateway matter.41 Gateway matters are for the court 
to decide and include issues “such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all 
or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.”42 The 
plurality reasoned that the question at issue was not about the “validity of the arbitration clause 
                                                 
30 Id. 




35 Id. at 450 
36 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 450 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 450 
39 Id. at 450 
40 Id. at 453 
41 Id.  
42 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452 
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nor its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties” but about “what kind of 
arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to,” therefore it is a procedural matter for the arbitrator 
to decide.43 The plurality further explained that the question “concern[ed] contract interpretation 
and arbitration procedures” which the Court believed “[a]rbitrators [were] well situated to 
answer.”44 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the plurality on the issue of class 
arbitrability. The Chief Justice stated that the question of what to be submitted to arbitration is an 
issue for the courts to decide, and not for an arbitrator.45 The Chief Justice believed that “the 
decision of what to submit to the arbitrator is a matter of contractual agreement by the parties, and 
the interpretation of that contract is for the court, not for the arbitrator.”46 After providing reason 
for the court to make the ultimate decision about the arbitration clause, the Chief Justice then 
interpreted the arbitration agreement to “expressly define ‘us’ as petitioner, and ‘you’ as the 
respondent or respondents named in that specific contract.”47 Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that 
the arbitration agreement made clear that the parties had not agreed to class arbitration.48   
2. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.  
After Bazzle, the Supreme Court addressed whether an arbitrator can require class 
arbitration when the parties are silent on the issue in the arbitration agreement in Stolt-Nielsen.49 
Stolt-Nielson is a shipping company that ships products for their customers and AnimalFeeds is a 
supplier of raw ingredients. 50  AnimalFeeds shipped its products pursuant to a charter party 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 453 
45 Id. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) 
46 Id. at 456 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) 
47. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 458-59 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) 
48 Id. at 459-460 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) 
49 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) 
50 Id. at 666 
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contract.51 Stolt-Neilsen was engaged in a price fixing scheme, and AnimalFeeds sued Stolt-
Neilsen in federal district court asserting antitrust claims.52 Many other parties sued Stolt-Neilsen 
and the “Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the consolidation of then-pending 
actions against petitioners, including AnimalFeeds’ action.”53 AnimalFeeds then served Stolt-
Nielsen with a demand for class arbitration and the parties agreed that “the question of class 
arbitration be submitted to a panel of three arbitrators.”54 The parties picked three arbitrators and 
agreed that their arbitration agreement was silent on the issue of class arbitration.55 The panel of 
arbitrators then concluded that the arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration.56  The District 
Court then vacated the award and held that the arbitrators’ decision was in “manifest disregard of 
the law.” 57 The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.58 
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that the arbitrators’ decision was 
contrary to the FAA, which requires consent to arbitrate.59 The Court reasoned that the arbitrators 
lacked a contractual basis for ordering class arbitration because the parties had previously agreed 
that their arbitration agreement was silent on the whether class arbitration was permitted.60 In 
addition, the court stated that “class arbitration changes the nature of bilateral arbitration to such a 
degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their 
disputes to an arbitrator.”61 In so holding, the Court distinguished Bazzle because the parties in 
Stolt-Nielson had expressly agreed that contract interpretation was to be submitted to an arbitration 
                                                 
51 Id. at 667 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 667-668 
54 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 668  
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 668-669 
57 Id. at 669 (internal quotations omitted) 
58 Id. at 670 
59 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 684 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 685 
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panel.62 Thus, the Court did not believe it needed to address the issue of who decides the class 
arbitrability, because the parties in Stolt-Nielson assigned the issue of arbitrability to an 
arbitrator.63 In addition, the Court explained that Bazzle was a plurality decision and did not bind 
the court to permit the arbitrator to decide whether class arbitration is permitted.64 
3. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court addressed “whether the FAA 
prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the 
availability of class-wide arbitration procedures.”65 The Concepcions66 entered into a contract with 
AT&T for the servicing of cell phones. 67  The arbitration agreement stipulated that there be 
arbitration for all disputes and that the claims “be brought in the parties' individual capacity, and 
not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”68 The 
Concepcions filed a complaint in district court and argued that the arbitration agreement was 
unconscionable because it prevented class procedures.69 The Ninth Circuit and the District Court 
believed that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.70 The Ninth Circuit did not believe 
that the California Supreme Court decision, Discover Bank v. Superior Court, was preempted by 
the FAA.71  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that California’s Discover Rule was preempted by 
the FAA because it interferes with arbitration. 72  The Court reasoned that class arbitration 
                                                 
62 Id. at 680 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) 
66 Id. (referring to Vincent and Liza Concepcion)  
67 Id.  
68 Id. (internal quotations omitted) 
69 Id. at 1744- 1745 
70 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) 
71 Id. at 1745 
72 Id. at 1750 
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“manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual” was inconsistent with the FAA because 
of the inherent differences between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration. 73  The Court 
addressed several factors of class arbitration that make it inherently different than bilateral 
arbitration, including sacrificing the informality of bilateral arbitration, mandating procedural 
formality, and increasing the risk to defendants because there are more defendants to one 
decision.74  
4. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter 
Most recently in Oxford Health LLC v. Sutter, the Supreme Court addressed whether an 
arbitrator exceeded his powers under the FAA when he found that an arbitration agreement 
permitted class arbitration. 75  The respondent, John Sutter, was a pediatrician who agreed to 
provide healthcare to Oxford Health Plans’ members within its network.76  Sutter entered into a 
contract with Oxford Health Plans, which contained an arbitration agreement.77  Sutter, on behalf 
of a class, filed a complaint in New Jersey Superior Court.78 The suit was referred to arbitration 
and the parties agreed to have an arbitrator decide if class arbitration was permissible under the 
agreement.79  The arbitrator found that class arbitration was permissible.80  The arbitrator reasoned 
the intent of the arbitration clause was to mandate arbitration for all civil actions that could be 
brought in court and the arbitrator found that a class action is a type of civil action.81 Oxford filed 
a motion in the district court to vacate the arbitrator’s decision and the district court denied the 
                                                 
73 Id. at 1750-1751 
74 Id. at 1751-1752 
75 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013) 
76 Id. at 2067 
77 Id. (The arbitration agreement read: “No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be 
instituted before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in New Jersey, 
pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association with one arbitrator.”) 
78 Id.  
79 Id 
80 Sutter, 133 S.Ct. at 2067 (2013) 
81 Id.  
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motion.82 The Third Circuit affirmed the decision.83 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.84  
 The Supreme Court found that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers when he reviewed 
the contract.85 The Court explained that the holding in Stolt-Nielson could not be applied because 
the parties in that case had agreed beforehand that the agreement was silent on the issue of class 
arbitration. 86  The Supreme Court further distinguished Stolt-Nielson because the arbitration 
decision in that case “lacked any contractual basis for ordering class procedures, not because it 
lacked… a sufficient one.”87 The Supreme Court noted that it has not addressed  “whether the 
availability of class arbitration is a question of arbitrability” and would not do so within the Oxford 
Health decision.88 Thus, the question of class arbitrability was left open.  
C. Circuit Cases Agreeing That An Arbitrator May Determine If Class Arbitration 
is Permitted Under An Arbitration Agreement 
The recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded on the issue of class arbitration. 
Currently, there is a circuit split amongst the circuit courts as to who decides if an arbitration 
agreement permits class arbitration if the contract is silent on the question. The Fifth Circuit, in an 
older opinion, has taken the Bazzle stance and it has ruled that the arbitrators are better positioned 
to address whether an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration. The Third and Sixth Circuits 
have used recent Supreme Court precedent and dicta in their reasoning and have concluded that 
courts are better positioned to address whether an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration.  
1. Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc. 
                                                 
82 Id. at 2068 
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 2069 
86 Sutter, 133 S.Ct. at 2069 (2013) 
87 Id. at 2069-2070 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the original) 
88 Id. at 2068 n.2  
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In Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc.,89 the Fifth 
Circuit held that an arbitrator should determine if the arbitration agreement permits class-wide 
arbitration, citing the decision of the Bazzle plurality.90 North American Indemnity91 had “entered 
into reinsurance contracts with 408 [self funded ERISA] Plans throughout the United States” and 
there were arbitration clauses92 in each contract.93 North American Indemnity allegedly breached 
the contracts by defaulting on payments of claims and then sued American Heartland Health 
Administrators, the third party administrator of the plans, for poor underwriting of the plans.94 The 
employer self-funded ERISA plans95 that contracted with North American Indemnity intervened 
in the action and the district court then discussed the possibility of certifying a class for 
arbitration.96 Pedcor argued against the class being certified and appealed the district court’s 
decision to certify the class.97  
 The Fifth Circuit believed the question of class arbitrability was resolved by the Bazzle 
plurality decision.98 The court reasoned that this case was analogous to Bazzle and should be 
decided under the Bazzle rule; therefore, the arbitrator should decide the question of class 
                                                 
89 343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003). 
90 Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003) 
91 Id. at 357 (North American Indemnity is an insurance company) 
92 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (The arbitration agreements required  “(1) any dispute between the parties hereto 
in connection with the Agreement be submitted to arbitration; (2) as a general matter each party chooses one 
arbitrator, and the two chosen arbitrators then select a third to constitute a panel; and (3) arbitration shall be 
governed by the laws of the State of Texas. There is no express provision in the clause regarding consolidation or 
class treatment of claims in arbitration.”) 
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan, 343 F.3d at 357  
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 359 
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arbitrability.99 The court agreed with the Bazzle analysis because the question of whether an 
arbitration clause permits class arbitration is a subsidiary question.100 
D. Circuit Cases Disagreeing That An Arbitrator May Determine If Class 
Arbitration is Permitted Under An Arbitration Agreement 
1. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett 
The Sixth Circuit in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett,101 was the first circuit after the recent  
Supreme Court decisions102 to consider the question of whether a court or an arbitrator may decide 
when an arbitration clause permits class-wide arbitration. 103   Crockett was a customer of 
LexisNexis, a business division of Reed Elsevier, and he had a plan with the company that 
contained an arbitration clause.104  Crockett filed an arbitration demand on behalf of two classes 
and LexisNexis brought suit in district court “seeking a declaration that the Plan's arbitration clause 
does not authorize class arbitration.”105 The arbitration agreement did not specifically mention 
class arbitration.106 The District Court in Ohio granted LexisNexis summary judgment based on 
the arbitration agreement not permitting class arbitration.107 
 In the decision, the Sixth Circuit first addressed whether an arbitrator or a court determines 
                                                 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 350 (quoting Bazzle, 539 U.S.  at 2407) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The question whether a 
contract forbids class arbitration concerns the kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to, and not the 
validity of the arbitration clause [ ]or its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties, the plurality 
concluded that arbitrators are well situated to answer that question.”) 
101 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013) (hereinafter short name referred to as ‘Reed Elsevier’). 
102Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); Oxford Health Plans 
LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013) 
103 Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 597  
104 Id. at 596 
105 Id 
106 Id. at 599 (The arbitration agreement stated “Except as provided below, any controversy, claim or counterclaim 
(whether characterized as permissive or compulsory) arising out of or in connection with this Order (including any 
amendment or addenda thereto), whether based on contract, tort, statute, or other legal theory (including but not 
limited to any claim of fraud or misrepresentation) will be resolved by binding arbitration under this section and the 
then-current Commercial Rules and supervision of the American Arbitration Association”) 
107 Id. at 596 
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if class-wide arbitration is permitted under the arbitration agreement.108 The Court explained that 
gateway disputes109 are for judicial determination and subsidiary questions110 are for an arbitrator 
to decide.111 The court reasoned that recent Supreme Court decisions have alluded that class-wide 
arbitrability is a gateway question and not a subsidiary question.112 The Court stated that because 
the Supreme Court has found the differences between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration to 
be “fundamental” the issue is a gateway question. 113  The Court relied on Stolt-Nielson and 
Concepcion to explain some of the inherent differences between class arbitration and bilateral 
arbitration.114 The court stated the benefits of bilateral arbitration, including “lower costs, greater 
efficiency and speed,” are less secure in class arbitration.115 These benefits, therefore, give rise to 
the assumption that the parties may not have mutually consented to class arbitration if it was not 
specifically stated in the arbitration agreement. 116  The court also stated that confidentiality 
becomes more difficult with class arbitration.117  In addition, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that 
“the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are comparable to those of class-action 
litigation.”118  
The Sixth Circuit also claimed that a switch from bilateral arbitration to class arbitration 
                                                 
108 Reed Elsevier, Inc., 734 F.3d at 597  
109 Id. at 597 (quoting Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452)( The court noted that “Gateway disputes include whether the parties 
have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type 
of controversy.) 
110 Id. at 597 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S. Ct. 909, 11 L. Ed. 2d 898 
(1964) (internal quotations omitted)) (explaining that “subsidiary questions grow out of the dispute and bear on its 
final disposition); Id. (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,, 537 U.S. 84-85 (2002) (internal quotations 
omitted)) 
 (“Subsidiary questions include, for example, issues related to waiver, delay, or whether a condition precedent to 
arbitrability has been fulfilled.”) 
111 Id. at 597 
112 Id. at 598 
113 Id. at 598  
114 Reed Elsevier, Inc., 734 F.3d  at 598 (6th Cir. 2013) 
115 Id. at 598 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010)) 
116 Id. at 598 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686, (2010)) 
117 Id. at 598 
118 Id. at 598 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686, (2010)))) 
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may raise due process concerns. 119  The Court stressed how consequential the class-wide 
arbitrability question was.120 The Court held that whether an arbitration agreement permits class 
arbitration is a gateway issue and therefore is for a court to decide.121 The Court went on to hold 
that the arbitration agreement did not permit class-wide arbitration, and, thus, affirmed the lower 
court.122 
2. Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc. 
The Third Circuit has also addressed the question of whether a court or an arbitrator may 
 decide when an arbitration clause permits class-wide arbitration.123 McCabe and Opalinski were 
employees of Robert Half International, Inc.124 McCabe and Oplainski brought a class claim on 
behalf of themselves and other employees based on Robert Half’s failure to pay them overtime.125 
They signed employment agreements with Robert Half in which the arbitration clause makes no 
mention of class-wide arbitration.126 Robert Half moved to compel arbitration on an individual 
basis. 127 The District Court affirmed in part and compelled arbitration, but ruled that the issue of 
whether it would be bilateral or class arbitration would be for an arbitrator to decide.128 Robert 
Half appealed to the Third Circuit for a determination of whether the arbitrator or the court makes 
the decision about the arbitration agreement permitting class arbitration.129 
                                                 
119 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at 2071-72) (Alito, 
J., concurring) (“where absent class members have not been required to opt in, it is difficult to see how an 
arbitrator's decision to conduct class proceedings could bind absent class members who have not authorized the 
arbitrator to decide on a class-wide basis which arbitration procedures are to be used.”) 
120 Id. at 599 
121 Id. at 598-599 
122 Id. at 599 
123 Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 761 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2014) 
124 Id. at 329 (hereinafter short name referred to as “Robert Half”) 
125 Id 
126 Id. The arbitration clause states “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to Employee's employment, 
termination of employment or any provision of this Agreement” shall be submitted to arbitration. 
127 Id.  
128 Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 761 F.3d at 329  
129 Id.  
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 The Third Circuit held that availability of class arbitration in an arbitration agreement is a 
matter for courts to decide.130 The court cast doubt on the plurality decision in Bazzle citing Stolt-
Nielson and Oxford Health, which both mentioned a Supreme Court majority had yet to decide the 
specific issue at bar.131 Further, the Third Circuit addressed its previous decision Quilloin v. Tenet 
HealthSystem Philadelphia Inc.,132 which stated that class-wide arbitration is not a question of 
arbitrability. 133  The Third Circuit stated that that specific line in their Quilloin v Tenet 
HealthSystem Philadelphia Inc. case was dictum and should therefore not be followed.134 
 The Third Circuit reached its decision in Robert Half after discussing several factors that 
demonstrate that class-wide arbitrability is a gateway matter for the courts to decide. The court 
began by stating class-wide arbitrability “affects whose claims may be arbitrated” because it 
includes people not aparty to the action.135 The court next stated that the “availability of class-wide 
arbitration implicates the type of controversy submitted to arbitration.”136 The court cited to Stolt-
Nielson and reasoned that class arbitration is not a procedural issue but a substantive one.137 The 
court also acknowledged the differences between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration 
addressed in Stolt-Nielson. 138 The court next stated that the only other court decision to address 
                                                 
130 Id. at 332 
131 Id. at 331 
132 673 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2012), 
133 Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 761 F.3d at 331  
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 332-333 
136 Id. at 333 
137 Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010))(“class-
action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented 
to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”) 
138 Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010)) 
(“[(1) a]n arbitrator . . . no longer resolves a single dispute between the parties to a single agreement, but instead 
resolves many disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties . . . [; (2)] the presumption of privacy 
and confidentiality that applies in many bilateral arbitrations [does] not apply in class arbitrations[,] thus potentially 
frustrating the parties' assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate[; (3) t]he arbitrator's award no longer purports to 
bind just the parties to a single arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties as well[; and (4)] 
the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation, even though the 
scope of judicial review is much more limited.”) 
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whether the availability of class arbitration in an arbitration agreement is a gateway issue or a 
subsidiary issue was the Sixth Circuit in Reed Elsevier.139 The Third Circuit acknowledged that its 
decision was guided by the Sixth Circuit decision in Reed Elsevier. 140  The Third Circuit 
distinguished cases from the Eleventh, 141  First 142  and Second 143  Circuits because the Court 
believed that they did not squarely address the issue of class-wide arbitrability.144 
III. ANALYSIS  
The Third and Sixth circuits focused on the inherent differences between bilateral and class 
arbitration. The inherent differences make class arbitrabilty a gateway issue for the courts to 
decide. The procedural differences of arbitration become enhanced in class arbitration and change 
the nature of what is agreed to. Hence, class arbitration magnifies all the procedural differences of 
bilateral arbitration, which can cause harm on the parties because class arbitration incorporates a 
large number of parties. Courts should also decide whether or not an arbitration agreement permits 
class arbitration because the courts are better equipped to deal with the consequences of making 
the determination whether or not class arbitration is appropriate. For example, courts have 
procedural safeguards to protect the parties if an improper decision is made and they also are able 
to reduce some of the issues with bilateral arbitration that get expounded in class arbitration.  
A. The Inherent Differences Between Bilateral Arbitration and Class 
Arbitration Make the Issue of Class Arbitrability a Gateway Matter 
Gateway matters address whether or not the parties are bound by the arbitration agreement 
or whether a binding arbitration clause applies to the particular issue.145 Specifically, gateway 
                                                 
139 Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 761 F.3d at 334  
140 Id. at 334 
141 Southern Communs. Servs. v. Thomas, 720 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2013) 
142 Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v. FSRO Ass'n Ltd., 683 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2012) 
143 Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011) 
144 Id. at 334-335(internal quotations and citations omitted)  
145 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 (2002) 
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matters are matters that determine if the arbitration agreement applies to the parties’ dispute. 
Subsidiary questions are questions that “grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition. 
146 Judge Ambro explained that subsidiary questions are questions the parties would want an 
arbitrator to decide and include allegations of waiver, delay, or similar defenses to arbitrability.147 
Because bilateral arbitration and class arbitration are so different, it cannot be assumed that one 
party bilaterally agreeing to arbitrate the issue is the same as that party agreeing to arbitrate the 
issue on a class-wide basis. The question of class arbitrability, when an arbitration agreement does 
not specify that an arbitrator will decide the issue, examines whether the arbitration agreement 
incorporates class action into the terms of the agreement. Therefore, it determines whether the 
parties can be bound by the agreement if the dispute is arbitrated through class arbitration instead 
of bilateral arbitration. Furthermore, deciding whether to allow class arbitration under arbitration 
clauses is a gateway matter because the question seeks to include other parties not originally bound 
by the arbitration clause. The inclusion of other parties directly bears on the question of whether 
or not the parties are bound by the arbitration agreement.    
a. Due Process Issues Heightened in Class Arbitration 
Class arbitration requires the arbitrator to resolve disputes for multiple parties instead of 
two parties, which magnifies due process concerns within class arbitration.148 Class arbitration is 
structured as opt-out rather than an opt in proceedings.149 During the proceeding, arbitrators follow 
either JAMS or AAA procedures for class arbitration.150 The AAA rules mandate that the arbitrator 
                                                 
146 Id. (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S.Ct. 909, 918 (1964)) 
147 Half Int'l, Inc., 761 F.3d at 331  
148 See e.g. Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (“An 
arbitrator chosen according to an agreed-upon procedure…no longer resolves a single dispute between the parties to 
a single agreement, but instead resolves many disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties.”) 
149 25 ABA Journal Lab. & Emp. Law 25, 29-30 
150 See JAMS Class Action Procedures, supra note 15; See AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, supra 
note 15 
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certify the class, stay arbitration after the class has been certified, and direct notice requirements.151 
In order to certify a class, the AAA provides that “each class member has entered into an agreement 
containing an arbitration clause which is substantially similar to that signed by the class 
representative(s) and each of the other class members.”152 This procedural requirement does not 
mandate that the class members all agree to the arbitrator appointed or have an identical arbitration 
agreement. Arbitration agreements are contractual and therefore are a “matter of consent.”153 The 
decision to allow an arbitrator to decide the availability of class arbitration implies that the parties 
(including absent class members) agreed to allow the arbitrator to decide issues pertaining to the 
dispute. Although each class member stipulated to arbitration of the dispute, each class member 
did not specifically agree to adjudicate the issue on a large scale or with the particular arbitrator. 
This issue is an important difference because arbitration awards cannot be reviewed on the 
merits.154 Class arbitration implicates absent party members and therefore makes the issue of class 
arbitrability more than just a mere procedural question for an arbitrator to decide.  
b. Conflicts of Interest 
 There are inherent conflicts of interest involved with class arbitration that may not be as 
apparent in bilateral arbitration. The arbitrator in class arbitration must select counsel for the class 
while the arbitrator in bilateral arbitration just receives notice if the party selects representation.155  
This small difference may cause ethical problems for the arbitrator in class arbitration that are not 
                                                 
151 See AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration Rule 4(a), supra note 15 
152 See AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration Rule 4(a)(6), supra note 15 
153 Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 298 n.6, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010); Volt Info. Scis. 
v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1256 (1989) (“Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not 
coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit.”) 
154 Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions at 1743-1744, supra note 16 




state%3D76cgzl5kf_71 ; 155 Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, supra note 15, Rule 6(b)(7) 
 20 
apparent in bilateral arbitration. The AAA Supplemental Guidelines for class arbitration do not 
specify any rules in which an arbitrator needs to follow to select counsel. 156  Moreover, the 
arbitrator is appointed by the original counsel in the dispute.157 The potential conflict occurs after 
the appointment of the arbitrator and before the certification of the counsel.158 Here the arbitrator 
that was chosen by the counsel must choose/ certify the counsel that appointed him. This is an 
inherent conflict of interest because the arbitrator may be inclined to appoint someone that 
appointed him as a possible return of the favor.  
 Moreover, arbitrators may face difficult decisions after settlements have been approved. 
For example, an arbitrator may be “asked to apportion the arbitration costs between the plaintiffs 
and the defendants.”159 Further, an arbitrator may have to award counsel fees or decide if the 
settlement fund will “reimburse class counsel for arbitration expenses (including the arbitrator’s 
fees).”160  
The main cause of concern comes with the large number of parties in class arbitration. For 
example, one biased arbitrator has the potential to affect hundreds of class members in one 
decision, whereas a biased arbitrator in a bilateral arbitration proceeding will only affect two 
parties. The conflicts are not apparent in bilateral arbitration, which depicts a substantial difference 
                                                 
156 Andrew Powell & Richard A. Bales, Ethical Problems in Class Arbitration, 2011 J. Disp. Resol. 309, 320 (2011)  
157 Ethical Problems in Class Arbitration, supra note 156, at 320-21 (“Unless there is another method in the 
contracted arbitration clause, the AAA provides a four-step system for counsel to select an arbitrator. First, the AAA 
sends each party a copy of the same prepared list of possible arbitrators. Second, the guidelines provide the parties 
15 days to strike names they object to and order the remaining possible arbitrators. Third, after the parties return the 
lists, the AAA notes the mutual selections for assignment of an arbitrator. Fourth, if the parties cannot agree on an 
arbitrator, the AAA will administratively appoint one. Once the original counsel has selected the arbitrator, the 
arbitrator then must certify the class in a fashion similar to the Federal Rules class certification process for judges.”) 
158 Id. at 322 (“Here is how arbitrator and class counsel selection can play out hypothetically: Counsel X chose 
Arbitrator Y for a potential class arbitration proceeding. This selection may be financially lucrative for Arbitrator Y, 
especially if the class action is complex. Counsel X may also like to have an appointment as class counsel because 
the selection is financially lucrative. Counsel X will then apply to Arbitrator Y for the financially lucrative 
appointment as class counsel. If Arbitrator Y appoints Counsel X as class counsel, the appointment may appear as 
an unspoken quid pro quo for the Counsel X's appointment of Arbitrator Y.”) 
159 supra, Note 141 
160 Id. 
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between the two types of arbitration. The difference depicts why class arbitratbility is a gateway 
matter because it substantially changes the nature of the arbitration agreement parties agreed to. 
An arbitrator should not be determine whether the arbitration agreement allows class arbitration 
unless the parties specifically stipulate that the arbitrator has the power to do so.  
c. Procedural Formalities of Class Arbitration Limit the Benefits of 
Arbitration 
The procedural formalities of class arbitration create an increased burden on the parties, 
which limit the benefits of class arbitration.161 The Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielson warned that 
“the relative benefits of class-action arbitration are much less assured, giving reason to doubt the 
parties’ mutual consent to resolve disputes through class-wide arbitration.”162 For example, class 
arbitration tends to last longer than bilateral arbitration.163 This increase in time ultimately changes 
one of the most significant aspects of arbitration—speed. A major benefit of arbitration is the speed 
of the action and the lack of reliance on courts to decide the action, which can take months or 
years. Allowing an arbitrator to decide if an arbitration clause allows for class arbitration allows 
the arbitrator to make a substantial decision.    
 In addition, many parties agree to arbitration to avoid expensive costs of litigation.164 The 
                                                 
161 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (“First, the switch from bilateral to class 
arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration--its informality--and makes the process slower, more 
costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”) 
162 Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685-86, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1775-76 (2010)  
163 Analysis of the American Arbitration Association’s Consumer Arbitration Caseload  available at 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004325 (“Cases conducted by documents only were awarded in 
approximately four months. In‐ person hearings were awarded in approximately six months.”); Contra Search Case 
Dockets and Awards (searched November 9, 2014) 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/disputeresolutionservices/arbitration/classarbitration/casedocketsearch?_afr
WindowId=mlkkvxayb_182&_afrLoop=3302530603099027&_afrWindowMode=0&_adf.ctrl-
state=mlkkvxayb_132 (where 39 out of 83 active class arbitrations were from the year 2012 or earlier.); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (The Supreme Court discussed class arbitration listed on 
the AAA’s docket stating “[f]or those cases that were no longer active, the median time from filing to settlement, 
withdrawal, or dismissal--not judgment on the merits--was 583 days, and the mean was 630 days.”) 
164 See e.g. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 1313 (2001) (“Arbitration agreements 
allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation”); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 257, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1464 
 22 
procedural benefit of avoiding expensive costs cannot be inferred in class arbitration because class 
arbitration is much more costly than bilateral arbitration due to the procedural requirements such 
as notice.165 For example the court in Eisen found the notice cost to be roughly $225,000.166 The 
notice cost only incorporated mailing letters to roughly two million people at a stamp rate of six 
cents, which would be much higher today.167 The price on notice is astronomical for a party that 
just wants to settle a small claim and did not intend their arbitration clause to be construed to allow 
class arbitration. This jump in cost is substantial and cannot just be regarded as a subsidiary issue 
to the arbitration dispute. This issue would be important enough to change the intent of the parties 
because the plaintiff would bear the burden of the notice costs. Although the plaintiff makes the 
decision to bring the dispute forward as class arbitration, absent class members that have not opted 
out may not have wanted to move forward with the dispute as a class arbitration.  
 Privacy of the arbitration agreement is also changed in regard to class arbitration. The 
AAA’s Rules on Class arbitration mandate that privacy and confidentiality of the proceeding will 
not apply to class arbitration.168 Parties that agreed to arbitration may not have agreed to arbitration 
that is not confidential. For example, companies may prefer arbitration due to the confidentiality 
and the efficiency of the process, but class arbitration potentially frustrates their assumption for a 
speedy confidential process. The lack of confidentiality may cause certain issues to leak to the 
press and cause bad publicity for the company. Further, plaintiffs may have wanted a confidential 
                                                 
(2009) (“Parties generally favor arbitration precisely because of the economics of dispute resolution.”) 
165 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass. v. BCS Ins. Co., 671 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Class actions always have 
been treated as special. One self-selected plaintiff represents others, who are entitled to protection from the 
representative's misconduct or incompetence. Often this requires individual notice to class members, a procedure 
that may be more complex and costly than the adjudication itself.”) 
166 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 167, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2147 (1974), 
167 Id. 
168 See supra note 15, Rule 9(“(a) The presumption of privacy and confidentiality in arbitration proceedings shall not 
apply in class arbitrations. All class arbitration hearings and filings may be made public, subject to the authority of 
the arbitrator to provide otherwise in special circumstances. However, in no event shall class members, or their 
individual counsel, if any, be excluded from the arbitration hearings.”)  
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proceeding when they argue their issue with the court. Under the lack of confidentiality, not only 
does an entire class know the proceeding, but anyone can be informed about the arbitration.  The 
lack of privacy is a substantial difference between bilateral and class arbitration and would be a 
reason why the courts should determine whether of not the parties agreed to class arbitration.  
d. Class Arbitration Binds Absent Party Members  
Class arbitration differs principally from bilateral arbitration because of its nature to bind 
class members not part of the original contract. Arbitration is a matter of consent, but class 
arbitration allows parties to be part of a class where the individuals did not consent to the 
arbitration.169 The AAA’s Supplemental Rules for Class arbitration track Fed. Civ. R. 23 but add 
the requirement that each class member have a similar arbitration clause to one another.170 
Although this rule adds more commonality amongst the class members, it does not require the 
class members to agree to class arbitration. This lack of consent by other parties denotes that class 
arbitration is not just an issue that grows out of the dispute, but an issue that has potentially far 
reaching affects. As previously discussed, class arbitration changes the nature of the arbitration at 
hand. The parties no longer have privacy in their dispute, there are increased costs, and the 
arbitration proceeding lasts longs. Therefore, the parties that have not opted out become members 
of the class arbitration with no judicial review of the merits of the arbitration award.171   
e. Increased Risk to the Parties in Class Arbitration  
In Concepcion the Supreme Court discussed the increased risk in class arbitration. They 
stated,  
                                                 
169 Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 298 n.6, 130 S.Ct. 2847, 2857 (2010) (citing Volt 
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 
103 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1989) (“Arbitration is strictly a matter of consent”); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 943(1995) (“arbitration is a way to resolve those disputes, but only those disputes, that the parties have 
agreed to submit to arbitration”) 
170  See supra Note 15, Rule 4(a)(6)   
171 Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, supra note 12, at 1743-1744 
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Informal procedures do of course have a cost: The absence of 
multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will go 
uncorrected. Defendants are willing to accept the costs of these 
errors in arbitration, since their impact is limited to the size of 
individual disputes, and presumably outweighed by savings from 
avoiding the courts. But when damages allegedly owed to tens of 
thousands of potential claimants are aggregated and decided at once, 
the risk of an error will often become unacceptable. Faced with even 
a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be pressured 
into settling questionable claims.172 
 
The magnitude of the dispute resolution inherently changes how parties will act or settle a matter. 
This new bargaining power associated with class action claims is significant and could potentially 
alter the outcome of the dispute, which makes class arbitration very different from bilateral 
arbitration. As the Supreme Court noted, the risk is substantial to the defendant because the 
defendant essentially could lose thousands of claims that were decided once through aggregation.  
 Furthermore, some of the important procedural aspects of court proceedings are not 
available in arbitration. This causes a minor issue in an individual arbitration proceeding to have 
catastrophic effects in a class arbitration proceeding because the impact exponentially grows.  For 
example, in bilateral arbitration discovery is limited and is not governed consistently.173 Instead of 
this limited discovery being an issue in one small matter, class arbitration makes limited discovery 
the basis of a decision that could potentially affect thousands of individuals.  
 In addition, the checks and balances associated in the judicial process are not available in 
class arbitration, which make class arbitration riskier to the parties than bilateral arbitration that 
                                                 
172 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) 
173 Randy Sutton, Annotation, Discovery in Federal Arbitration Proceedings Under Discovery Provision of Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. § 7, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as Permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 
81(&setaskeyeda;)(6)(B), 45 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 51 (“Discovery is governed, not only by an arbitrator's discretion, but 
also by the arbitration clause in the applicable agreement, arbitration rules adopted by the parties, statutes, and case 
law.”) 
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just deals with two parties. In class arbitration, the final award is not as easily appealed as a final 
court judgment. Arbitral awards are only vacated   
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material 
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights 
of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted 
was not made.174 
 
This processes makes vacating an arbitral award more difficult than regular class action awards 
decided by a court. The Supreme Court has also noted that the judicial review of the arbitrator’s 
decision lacks the necessary review to decrease the risk of error.175 The difficulty in vacating an 
arbitral award coupled with the added complexity stemming from multiple parties creates an 
increased risk of error if the arbitrator decided the issue incorrectly. Whereas, in bilateral 
arbitration, the risk of error is small because only the one dispute would be sided incorrectly as 
opposed to thousands of parties.  
f. Courts Are Better Suited to Deal Class Arbitration because It Will Provide 
Binding Precedent for Parties to Follow 
 Courts should make the determination of class arbitrability because they are better suited 
to deal with all of the repercussions of class arbitration determinations than arbitrators are. They 
are better suited because of the structure of the judicial system. Arbitrators are free to make a 
decision in their dispute based on applicable law but their decisions are not binding on the next 
                                                 
174 9 U.S.C § 10  
175 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (“The AAA rules do authorize judicial review 
of certification decisions, but this review is unlikely to have much effect given these limitations; review under § 10 
focuses on misconduct rather than mistake.”) 
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arbitration matter. 176  Therefore, if arbitrators are allowed to decide disputes about of class 
arbitrability, there will be no precedent for them to follow when trying to formulate a framework 
or decision process. On the other hand, courts function on precedential opinion, and they therefore 
can formulate a framework on how to address if a party can proceed to class arbitration. 
There reliance on precedent will provide more stability in what constitutes an arbitration 
clause that permits class arbitration and what does not; thus it benefits employers/corporations and 
employees/consumers. This reliance on precedent allows for more confidence in the arbitration 
clause at hand. Mike Jones, a Reed Smith LLP partner, stated that “Employers ought to be 
confident now that they can adopt polices to completely eliminate the risk of class-based litigation 
and have a faster, cheaper alternative to the litigation of employment claims in court.”177 Courts 
deciding whether or not class arbitration is permitted create more stability in what constitutes an 
arbitration clause that allows class arbitration. Courts will have binding precedent to guide their 
decisions; whereas arbitrators make independent decisions and have no precedent to follow.  
Courts deciding whether or not an arbitration clause is permitted allows for more 
uniformity not just in their basing their decision on precedents, but the availability of appeals for 
the parties affected by the decision. For example, courts deciding class arbitrability makes it easier 
for employers to appeal the decision.178 Employers no longer have to find some type of misconduct 
in the arbitrator’s decision because they can appeal the decision through regular court procedures. 
This is especially helpful if there is a mistake made in the analysis. Employers would now be able 
                                                 
176 See Regulatory Notice 09-16, available at 
https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p118141.pdf  (“As with current 
FINRA awards, explained decisions will have no precedential value in other cases. Arbitrators will not be required 
to follow any findings or determinations set forth in prior explained decisions.”) 
177 Ben James, Employers To Embrace Arbitration After 3rd Circ. Ruling, (July 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.law360.com/articles/562489/employers-to-embrace-arbitration-after-3rd-circ-ruling 
178supra note 167 (“The biggest reason employers don't want an arbitrator deciding whether class proceedings are 
available is the same reason they don't want arbitrators overseeing class actions: because arbitrators' decisions are 
extremely difficult to overturn.” ) 
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to cite to the law and appeal the decision. This cuts the same way for employees, who would also 
have a procedural mechanism to appeal the court’s decision if it is not based on precedential law.179 
Therefore, the ability to appeal will allow for more stability because the courts will base their 
decisions on existing law.  
Further, allowing courts to decide whether or not an arbitration agreement permits class-
wide arbitration reduces the risk of bias.  Arbitrators are paid based on their role in the arbitration, 
whereas judges are governmental employees that are not paid based on their role in a particular 
dispute. Arbitrators may be more inclined to find that the arbitration agreement permits class 
arbitration because they financially benefit from this finding.180  Taking this decision away from 
arbitrators allows arbitrators to focus on the dispute if it does warrant class arbitration and takes 
away the risk that they will focus more on their personal gain than the dispute at hand. Furthermore, 
it is good for employees/consumers because they can avoid arbitrator bias.181 Arbitrator bias is 
inherent when employers/ large corporations hire arbitrators that make decisions in 
corporation/employer’s favor.182  Although courts would make the decision of class 
arbitrability when the parties are silent on the issue of class arbitration, the decision of the Third 
and Sixth Circuits would still allow parties to stipulate that an arbitrator should make that decision. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 An arbitration agreement that does not specifically mention class arbitration but has a 
contractual basis for assuming that class arbitration is included, poses many issues. Currently there 
                                                 
179 28 U.S.C.S § 1292 
180 supra note 167  
181 Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of 
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 238-39 (1998) (study of arbitrations between 1993 
and 1995) 
182 supra note 171 
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is no binding Supreme Court precedent to follow in deciding whether a court or an arbitrator makes 
the decision. The Sixth and Third Circuits, using Supreme Court dicta, have held that the 
differences between bilateral and class arbitration cause the decision of class arbitrability to be a 
gateway question instead of a subsidiary question.  
The analysis by Sixth and Third Circuits are correct because they focus on the extensive 
differences of bilateral and class arbitration. Because bilateral arbitration and class arbitration are 
so different, it cannot be assumed that one party bilaterally agreeing to arbitrate the issue is the 
same as that party agreeing to arbitrate the issue on a class-wide basis. Put differently, the 
differences between the class and bilateral arbitration change the agreement so much that it makes 
question of class arbitrability is a gateway issue. It cannot presumed that arbitrators have the power 
to decide the issue, when the question of class arbitrability is about whether or not the specific 
issue is permitted in the arbitration agreement. The two types of arbitration differ so substantially, 
that allowing arbitrators to make the class arbitrability decision would give arbitrators more power 
under the arbitration agreement.  
In addition, courts should determine the availability of class arbitration under an arbitration 
agreement because they are better suited to weigh the inherent issues with class arbitration. Courts 
provide safeguards of their decision by allowing parties to appeal. This will limit the amount of 
instances that parties will need to proceed with class arbitration when their arbitration clause did 
not provide for it at all. Further, the impartiality of the judges in the court system will provide for 
a uniform manner of addressing class arbitration that will give the topic more stability. 
